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Abstract  This article considers the notion of ambiguity 
and its treatment by critics and theorists from a perspective 
informed by the work of Slavoj Žižek, according to which 
ambiguity should not be conceived as an exceptional 
‘grimace’ of language’s deeper, more genuine 
‘Unambiguity’; rather, the pervasive fantasy of Unambiguity 
should be thought of as the grimace of ambiguity – a 
convenient invention whose function is to mask the Void of a 
generalised indeterminacy feared by literary critics. It 
examines not only ambiguity’s ideological functions in 
literature, but ideology’s role in the critical conceptualisation 
of ambiguity. Eleanor Cook’s article, ‘Ambiguity and the 
Poets’, is taken to exemplify the much-maligned concept’s 
strangely persistent usefulness for an enriched understanding 
of poetry, but also the contradictoriness of the positions 
adopted by liberal interpreters. Revisiting poems by 
Elizabeth Bishop and Wallace Stevens discussed by Cook, 
and adding a reading of Tess Gallagher’s ‘Instructions to the 
Double’, the article demonstrates 1) the social character of 
ambiguity in those texts, and 2) how the moral hesitation 
about linguistic instability evident in the language of Cook’s 
article – ambiguity’s ‘mixed reputation’ – highlights 
anxieties around sexual and economic power within critical 
discourse. Critics’ implicit and ever-frustrated desire for 
‘Unambiguity’ (an ideal of stable semantics and a 
correspondingly well-ordered society) is symptomatic of the 
contradictions of their historical moment and the bourgeois 
assumptions of ‘traditional’ literary criticism. It is therefore 
proposed, in conclusion, that unblinking attention to the 
unfinished, ambiguous nature of social and linguistic reality 
is a more effective path to political change, and indeed to the 
effective appreciation of poetry, than unspoken appeals to 
this fantasy of unachievable Unambiguity. 
Keywords  Unambiguity, Poetic Ambiguity, Elizabeth 
Bishop, Tess Gallagher, Ideology, Indeterminacy, Wallace 
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But one only woke people if one knew what one wanted 
to say to them. And she wanted to say not one thing, but 
everything. Little words that broke up the thought and 
dismembered it said nothing. ‘About life, about death; 
about Mrs Ramsay’ – no, she thought, one could say 
nothing to nobody. 
Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse 
According to Eleanor Cook, in her article ‘Ambiguity and 
the Poets’, the term ambiguity is currently out of favour 
amongst critics and theorists. In part, she argues, this is 
because its usage at one time became so vague that it had 
virtually lost all meaning, and partly because it has of late 
been replaced by talk of a thoroughgoing ‘indeterminacy’ in 
the wake of deconstruction’s contribution to debates about 
multiple meaning and the problems of interpretation. She 
indicates that this is a matter for some disquiet, as the waning 
of ambiguity seems to imply the end of attention to aesthetic 
particularity in literary studies.i However, since her article 
was published (in 2008), interesting discussions have 
continued to speak of ‘ambiguity’, suggesting that the term 
might have unexpected longevity. If ambiguity is indeed 
refusing to go quietly, it may offer some useful historical 
perspective on the many recent theorised explorations of 
plural meaning in literature; I think it is important, however, 
that we should use and think about the term in ways which 
keep the important questions open, rather than embracing it 
in a nostalgic return to an older, more comforting, set of 
assumptions. Throughout its modern history in the language 
of criticism, ambiguity has had both an enigmatic and a 
recalcitrant quality. Empson, who played a large role in 
propelling it to the forefront of critical discussion in his 
Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), recognised its inherent 
difficulty, and yet (once we are started on the search for it) 
irresistibility. His book is so important, not just because it is 
so good at spotting ambiguities, but because it shows how 
the problem of ambiguity goes to the heart of the critical 
activity itself, as when he says at the outset that 
‘Sometimes … the word may be stretched absurdly far, but it 
is descriptive because it suggests the analytical mode of 
approach, and with that I am concerned.’ (Empson 1) 
Cook’s central concern is to demonstrate, through a series 
of close readings, that (against the recent preference for 
indeterminacy) the notion of ambiguity still has great 
efficacy for demonstrating the richness of the ‘many-sided’ 
meaning in poetry, and she draws upon earlier theorists such 
as William Empson, W. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, and 
Winnifred Nowottny, whose thinking preceded the 
‘deconstructive turn’, for the conceptual basis of her 
approach. By contrast, recent contributions by, for example, 
Betty Rojtman, Dominique Vaugeois, and David G. Brooks 
place the topic in a more topical, poststructuralist-tinged 
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problematic and raise issues of desire and the relationship 
between ambiguity and ‘reality’. Whether openly or 
implicitly, these older and newer approaches all suggest that 
ambiguity reveals more about the position of the critic or 
theorist than about the literary text, and this is something I 
shall take as my starting-point here. In contrast to the 
majority of these discussions, however – which appear to 
take for granted that the topic of ambiguity is a politically 
neutral one – I shall attempt to think-through the issue of 
ambiguity from a materialist perspective, making use of the 
framework provided by Slavoj Žižek’s re-reading of Lacan, 
in order to explore the ideological dimension of the critics’ 
reflections upon poetic ambiguity. Such an exploration 
suggests that critics and theorists of ambiguity working 
within the assumptions of a liberal-capitalistic culture (as to 
some extent, given the historical moment we inhabit, all 
those of us in Western intellectual life must) tend to be 
driven, often unknowingly, by the desire for an ideal 
Unambiguity, a phantasm which defines the limits of their 
understanding and their sense of reality. 
1. ‘Ties’ and ‘Tears’: Art and Ambiguity 
Before passing on to examine ‘Unambiguity’, it is 
worthwhile considering the merits of the ‘traditional’ mode 
of critical analysis via ambiguity which, I am going to argue, 
is haunted by that negative spectre. It is important to 
recognise the power of the concept, and how, even for these 
earlier interpreters, plural meaning is bound up with the very 
nature of literary art and the ways in which we try to 
understand it. Winifred Nowottny, in The Language Poets 
Use, writes of  
a real connection between art and ambiguity, in that the 
ambiguity inherent in the medium itself serves as a 
bridgehead between ‘things as they are’ and the 
significance that may be imputed to them. The ambiguity 
of the medium enables the poet to meet that double 
demand that we make of the language of poetry, that it 
should deal both with the phenomenal world and with the 
world of values. (Nowottny 162) 
Empson asserts that ‘the machinations of ambiguity are 
among the very roots of poetry’ (Empson 3), arguing 
similarly that the ‘many-sidedness’ of the artistic medium is 
what enables it to illuminate the complexity of the world of 
cultural experiences and values, but more specifically of 
social values. In the passage just quoted, which concerns 
Shakespeare’s line ‘Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet 
birds sang’ (Sonnet 73), Empson shows that his sense of the 
richness of association in a poem is deeply connected with its 
complex rootedness in social life, which ranges all the way 
from the qualities the poet might have found sexually 
alluring to the psycho-social impact of the dissolution of the 
monasteries. The ambiguity of the poetic medium thus 
makes it possible to grasp the many-sidedness of social value 
systems and the conflicts within them, out of which the 
poems have grown and within which they are read. 
In ‘Ambiguity and the Poets’, Cook’s reading of Elizabeth 
Bishop’s ‘Chemin de Fer’ is an effective demonstration of 
ambiguity in action, but it gives a sense that the poem’s 
ambiguity can be noted, but must be swerved from before its 
social implications are seen to take on a political character. It 
begins from a lexical ambiguity which then acts as a thematic 
key for the whole text: the hesitation over whether the ‘ties’ 
in the third line refer to part of the railway track (the sleepers), 
suggesting the imminent possibility of a crash, or whether 
the ‘ties’ are emotional ones, suggesting ambivalence about 
a relationship possibly both suffocating and distant, with a 
sense that the speaker is in flight from an unbearable 
personal situation: 
Alone on the railroad track 
I walked with pounding heart. 
The ties were too close together 
or maybe too far apart. 
The text is ambiguous in form and execution (its wording), 
and this increases the extent to which ambiguity of situation 
and emotion are themes of the poem. In particular, the 
reader’s feeling of being torn between semantic alternatives 
reinforces their appreciation of the speaker’s traumatised 
self-division. Further, the ambiguity around ‘ties’ mingles, 
or ties, together perceptions of the physical world with the 
‘values’ of emotional experience to create a powerful, yet 
open-ended artistic representation. 
In both the ties and the uncertain echoes, the poem 
exploits interplay between the physical environment and the 
reflective mind, accentuating the way poetic form acts as 
mediator between world and idea, and this artistic mediation 
through ambiguity also becomes part of the overarching 
theme of the poem, along with its exploration of a confused 
or traumatised state, and (to go beyond Cook’s reading of it) 
of alienated social, as well as personal, experience, within 
which ‘ties’ of all kinds have stopped making sense. A 
dynamic modern transport system, the railway, makes the 
perfect ironic vehicle for a poem dwelling upon stasis or 
entropy – emotional, intellectual, and, obliquely, historical. 
This alienated social experience is symbolised in the drear 
landscape through which the speaker moves: 
The scenery was impoverished: 
scrub-pine and oak; 
beyond its mingled gray-green foliage 
I saw the little pond 
where the dirty old hermit lives, 
lie like an old tear 
holding onto its injuries 
lucidly year after year. 
These stanzas are centred upon a second major ambiguity, 
that between ‘tear’ as a rent or injury and the ‘tear’ one 
weeps, two different words which, as the poem demonstrates, 
are intertwined in its portrait of traumatic emotions, but 
which might also have led to an analysis of the poem’s 
ruminations on a world of relationships alienated by the 
system of society. As a wound in a surface, the ‘tear’ remains 
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a trauma which cannot be healed; as a droplet of salt water, it 
remains ‘lucidly’ clear-sighted and undeceived about what 
has occasioned it: an image which speaks of the need to face, 
rather than wink at, ‘injuries’ or injustice, and also to feel 
what others feel, because this lucid teardrop is a universal 
one, distilling tragic historical memory. 
2. Late for Dinner: Ambiguity and 
Ideology 
Other approaches are less reticent about this collective 
element to the emotional complexity registered in poetry. 
That of Dominique Vaugeois contrasts with Cook’s in that 
she emphasises the degree of social power at work in acts of 
interpretation and the ways we understand the nature of 
ambiguity. That power, she argues, depends upon the 
interpreter’s own position, the limitation or ‘blind spot’ 
(Vaugeois 443) which makes their point of view possible. 
Such a position is necessarily bound up with various kinds of 
social power: ‘The blindest part of our blind spot is almost 
certainly our knowledge of our own position while we 
observe another subject. And of course, this position need 
not be restricted to spatial and sensorial coordinates, but also 
social, economic, historical, gender coordinates that we do 
not ourselves master.’ (Vaugeois 443) Her taking into 
account of the social might usefully illuminate the 
meditation upon historical trauma via ambiguity in Bishop’s 
poem to a greater extent than is possible through the liberal 
humanist assumptions about ambiguity and the role of the 
reader operative in Cook’s account. 
This element of the local perspective of the critic, 
positioned within the structures of the social order, becomes 
apparent in examples from a number of critics and theorists 
in which a tone of moral condemnation is used in speaking of 
ambiguity, and even in referring to an author who fails to 
exclude it appropriately. For example, according to Cook, 
ambiguity is ‘the bane of translators, who must decide 
whether it is intentional or merely casual, and if casual, 
whether the author is careless or lazy or ignorant.’ (Cook 
230). The choice appears to be between crediting the 
sagacious author with intentional manipulation of ambiguity 
as a literary device, and charging him or her with morally 
culpable carelessness, laziness, or plain ignorance – in other 
words, with a failure to maintain their defences against 
ambiguity, thought of as the insidious decay that language 
and the world inevitably bring with them. Thus, occasionally 
Ambiguity (Cook’s sometimes personified representation of 
her/it sometimes cries out, in vain, for a capital A) can be a 
‘guest’ (Cook 230) who is ‘useful and even welcome’ (that is, 
when intended), and decidedly bad news at other times (that 
is, when she represents a failure of authorial control): ‘She 
[A/ambiguity] is disliked and avoided in some realms’ (Cook, 
230). In short, there is a drawing of boundaries, a creation of 
separate ‘realms’, which the personified Ambiguity is 
prevented from freely traversing, unless there is some 
censurable laxity in the police. 
There is thus an ideological dimension to the 
morally-charged language that often colours the depiction of 
linguistic ambiguity. This feature of natural language is 
tolerated only selectively by civilisation, an aspect of the 
wild with which bourgeois citizens must for their own good 
now and again reconnect (through poetry), but which, if left 
unchecked, would be harmful to both property and propriety. 
Cook’s implied audience might be imagined as a 
constituency of respectable burghers, appalled at the 
prospect of uncontrolled meaning: ‘We do not want 
ambiguity in legislation. Nor do we want it in our wills or in 
our financial affairs.’ (Cook 230) These concerns, at once 
socially exclusive and presented as universal by the plural 
pronoun, assume that ‘we’ have ‘financial affairs’, or much 
to leave in ‘our wills’, a state of affairs which continues to 
elude the majority of people on the planet. Unambiguous 
legislation, held up as another good reason to shut Ambiguity 
out in the cold, also serves the cause of property, inheritance, 
and the orderly transmission of wealth. Even an amusing 
anecdote about Canadian ‘collector lanes’ might be read 
through such a lens. In the story, Cook’s Australian visitor 
inadvertently breaches one polite protocol (punctuality) in an 
attempt to honour another (financial prudence), when he falls 
prey to ambiguity: ‘He assumed – logically enough – that 
these were toll highways, collecting money, and so avoided 
them, overshot the city, and was late for dinner. In fact, 
collector lanes simply siphon off – that is, collect – traffic 
that is preparing to exit.’ (Cook 230) 
Cook points out that A/ambiguity is ‘welcome’ to liars, 
unreliable oracles like the witches in Macbeth, writers of 
equivocal employment references, and so on, before 
proceeding to show how ambiguity is so important to poetry. 
This shows that the ‘mixed reputation’ of Ambiguity does 
not arise from different preferences, but rather, that 
Ambiguity can be a source of hesitation in one and the same 
mind, and indeed within a key ideological formation 
structuring the world-view of capitalism. The liberal 
discourse on ambiguity is irritated by this dilemma: whilst 
Ambiguity subverts the lucid semantics needed for good 
business, she is integral to Literature; Literature (or its idea) 
in turn plays an important role in ideologically legitimising 
the existing social order by aestheticising it, naturalising it, 
or by claiming to ‘transcend’ it, at least when it is taught in 
certain ways. 
This gesture by which Ambiguity is simultaneously 
ushered into poetry and excluded from ‘life’, recurs 
frequently in the critical literature on plurality of meaning. 
Empson notes, from the outset, that ‘An ambiguity, in 
ordinary speech, means something very pronounced, and as a 
rule witty or deceitful.’ (Empson 1) [my emphasis] Moreover, 
it is partly because of its pejorative connotations that 
Winifred Nowottny suggests replacing the term ‘ambiguity’ 
with ‘extralocution’: 
In discussing the poet’s use of the potential ambiguity of 
language at large, we need some term likely to act as a 
corrective of the tendency to associate ambiguity with a 
censurable ineptitude in the use of words. A term 
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suggestive of success rather than failure might help us 
out of some critical difficulties that follow from the 
entertaining of unreal notions of the processes by which 
meaning is established. For however true it may be, in 
theory, that the Empsonian approach to ambiguity 
‘permits a fresh and searching examination of literary 
works’, [quoting Dictionary of World Literary Terms, ed. 
Joseph T. Shipley (London, 1955), p. 15] this or any 
comparable approach is likely to excite misunderstanding 
and even irritation if it appears to advocate as a virtue 
what many of us have been taught to regard as a vice. 
(Nowottny 155) [my emphasis] 
As Geoffrey N. Leech puts it, ‘If an ambiguity comes to our 
attention in some ordinary functional use of language, we 
generally consider it a distraction from the message and a 
defect of style. But if it occurs in a literary text, we tend to 
give the writer the benefit of the doubt, and assume that a 
peaceful coexistence of alternative meanings is intended.’ 
(Leech 204) [my emphasis]. Literature is thus a space in 
which we are prepared to see ambiguity as deliberate. Moral 
condemnation does not apply as long as we can reasonably 
consider the context to be literary. 
Similarly, according to Soon Peng Su, 
Positive value is given to ambiguity in literature because 
the process of producing a literary piece, involving 
numerous rewritings and revisions, reduces the 
likelihood of accidental ambiguities. This leads to the 
assumption on the part of literary critics that ambiguity in 
literature, and poetry especially, is deliberate and 
contributes to the larger design of the work. (Su, p. 6) 
This suggests that accidental ambiguity is to be considered a 
fault (one condemned, as Su notes on the same page, by 
Aristotle), even in Literature, although the nature of 
Literature supposedly reduces the likelihood that any plural 
meanings will not fit into the authorial design. Plainly, there 
is an assumption by these theorists that the deleterious 
effects of ambiguity in ‘ordinary language’, whether 
accidental, deceitful, or the result of simple showing off, can 
be ameliorated, even fully controlled, by the artistic creator. 
Literary ambiguity is regulated transgression, a creative walk 
on the wild side, but not too far on the wild side. It is as if the 
author’s proprietorial control over the literary text creates a 
privatised space in which they can be as ambiguous as they 
like behind closed doors without causing offence to the 
surrounding community.  
3. Cherchez la Femme: Ambiguity and 
Sexual Politics 
As we have seen, Cook demonstrates, through ‘Chemin de 
Fer’, how ambiguity, conceived both as a verbal quibble and 
as a division in the mind, powerfully underlies literary 
effects. Furthermore, such a division is also characteristic of 
her own, and other critics’, (re)presentation of ambiguity. 
Indeed, the imagined world of alienated erotic experience in 
the poem, with its speaker wandering onto the wrong side of 
the tracks, to encounter those, like the hermit, who have been 
wounded by love, echoes the critic’s characterisation of 
Ambiguity. The first two sentences of the article both 
personify and gender the phenomenon of ambiguity 
strongly: 
A stranger meeting ambiguity for the first time might 
well be taken aback by her mixed reputation. She is 
disliked and avoided in some realms, whereas in others 
she is welcome. A philosopher like J. L. Austin will 
patrol the streets of language in order to identify 
ambiguity in his book, How To Do Things With Words. 
(Cook 230) 
This figure, appearing in the opening sentences of Cook’s 
article, excites both attraction and suspicion: Ambiguity 
(Cook’s humorous character sketch cries out for the capital 
A) is the kind of character who might have escaped from a 
hardboiled detective novel. Ambiguity has a ‘mixed’, or 
ambiguous, reputation. Of course, ‘reputation’ is itself an 
ambiguous phenomenon, of dubious origins and value, and 
prone to manipulation. Cook paints a shadowy world in 
which a woman of dubious or, at best, ‘mixed’ reputation 
encounters strangers in morally ambiguous situations. There 
seems to be a strong implication that Ambiguity is to be (or 
often just is) considered morally reprehensible, unreliable 
and untrustworthy. In this somewhat noir fable, she is false, 
inauthentic, even meretricious. This offender against 
conventional morality and property is, however, imagined as 
under the watchful eye of the conceptual police, led by 
Austin and the philosophers of language. ii This colourful 
representation of linguistic ambiguity which, overtly at least, 
only lasts for a sentence or so, is an interesting symptom of 
the tendency for critical discussions of ambiguity to accrue 
both moral and gendered dimensions. There is felt to be 
something suspect about ambiguity (or Ambiguity) and on 
that basis a parallel is implied between proliferation of 
meanings and the allegation of unreliability in Woman. 
Whilst traditionally-minded critics and theorists have 
tended to linger in this dilemma, finding Ambiguity at once 
distasteful and irresistible, poetry has explored these 
questions in much more incisive and unabashed ways. Tess 
Gallagher’s ‘Instructions to the Double’ wittily explores the 
politics of the way in which double meaning and sexual 
duplicity tend to be attached to Woman by members of the 
patriarchal literary and social ‘country club’. The poem plays 
on the doubling or multiplying of its speaker’s identities. The 
title may mean both ‘instructions to the speaker’s alter ego’ 
and ‘instructions to be carried out at the double, without 
hesitation or quibbling’: 
So now it’s your turn 
little mother of silences, little 
father of half-belief. Take up 
this face, these daily rounds 
with a cabbage under each arm 
convincing the multitudes 
that a well-made-anything 
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could save them. Take up 
most of all, these hands 
trained to an ornate piano 
in a house on the other side 
of the country. 
The ‘Double’ of Gallagher’s poem is of questionable, or 
plural, gender: it appears to be both ‘little mother of silences, 
little / father of half-belief’. Whilst Cook’s critical theory 
appears to introduce the feminine Ambiguity, only to change 
her immediately into an ‘it’, Gallagher’s poetic speaker 
relishes the many-sidedness of her creation. The mother here 
seems to represent the silencing of women within patriarchy, 
the father ineffectual courage. This creature of mixed gender 
is being sent out into the world, having taken up ‘this face’ 
and ‘these hands’, to take its ‘turn’, the speaker herself 
having apparently given up the effort of living in such a 
punishing world. 
In the poem’s second paragraph, the Double is urged to go 
into the world precisely as a creature of ‘mixed reputation’, 
playing many of the roles one could imagine being adopted 
by Cook’s Ambiguity. For instance, there is the femme fatale, 
Cook’s wayward, enigmatic will-o’-the-wisp, dangerously 
promiscuous with meaning, truth and identity: 
Get into some trouble 
I’ll have to account for. Walk 
into some bars alone with a slit in your skirt. Let 
the men follow you on the street 
with their clumsy propositions, their 
loud hatreds of this and that. 
The poetic treatment of these problems here indicates the 
possibility of an approach to ambiguity which eschews the 
questionable distinction between poetic and other kinds of 
language, and the reliance upon the author’s intentions 
necessary to maintain this distinction. Moreover, the poem 
makes a virtue out of the connections between the apparently 
technical issue of poetic ambiguity and the impact of social 
power. 
Nowottny attempts to get around the moral double 
standard habitually applied to ambiguous language, but her 
analysis, in introducing the concept of ‘extralocution’, 
although fascinating and ingenious, still clings to the 
supposed reassurance of intentionalism: 
A tolerable term for these cases might be the term 
‘extraloquial’, if one might suppose that it would suggest 
having extra meaning or leaving extra meaning in. … 
Having more meanings than one is the result of not 
entering into the full commitment of unequivocal 
assertion … . Extralocution is a stopping short of 
complete specification, of the maximal exclusion of 
alternatives … to use a word or phrase extraloquially is to 
refrain from limiting the potential of the context, whilst at 
the same time drawing attention to the potential. 
(Nowottny 155-6) 
Rather than an excessive invader and multiplier, like the 
femme fatale Ambiguity, extralocution is marked by 
restrained self-control. Ingeniously, what is refused is not 
excess but limitation itself. The poet is free to demur from 
common sense and thus to stop herself from excluding 
alternative possibilities. From this point of view, poetic 
madness becomes a case of self-possession, of having 
sufficient confidence to let readers make up their own minds. 
The beauty of this reversal is that it allows the critic to 
celebrate and explore the artistic resources opened up by the 
coexistence of so many possibilities, whilst forestalling 
moralistic accusations of irresponsibility in literary criticism. 
It does not, however, get around the central problem: that 
the theory of ambiguity exhibits such a strong desire – and it 
is a desire rather than an achievable aim – to corral plurality 
of meaning within the exceptional zone of the poetic, whilst 
preserving the integrity of an essential realm of unambiguous 
‘ordinary language’. Indeed, despite noting, via Charles C. 
Fries, the falsity of the idea that there is a ‘basic’ meaning for 
each word, against which all others are ‘figurative’ or 
‘illegitimate’ (Nowottny 159), Nowottny’s notion of the 
‘extra’, allowed to remain in the ‘extraloquial’ (as she notes, 
‘the prefix “extra-” is often outside or apart from’ (Nowottny 
156) assumes that these ambiguous possibilities are 
exceptional, and thus poetic, rather than themselves merely 
ordinary. Ultimately, her version is as much a fantasy of the 
author’s sovereignty over meaning as any other critic’s. By 
contrast, Gallagher’s poem celebrates the morally 
questionable qualities which have been attached to linguistic 
and artistic ambiguity by critics and theorists, suggesting that 
the ‘mixed’ attitude to a feminised ambiguity is in part an 
expression of patriarchal uneasiness about women’s 
emancipation, internalised by both male and female 
commentators. The men here are loud, boorish and stupid. 
The female Double provokes but also eludes their meanings: 
Slut, mother, 
virgin, whore, daughter, adulteress, lover, 
mistress, bitch, wife, cunt, harlot, 
betrothed, Jezebel, Messalina, Diana, 
Bathsheba, Rebecca, Lucretia, Mary, 
Magdelena, Ruth, you – Niobe, 
woman of the tombs. 
It enjoys the multiple potential, and the unravelling of 
fixed and naturalised identities, in this ‘Double’ who might, 
in double-quick time, transgress the limits of existing social 
relations. 
4. ‘The Possible Meaning of Surprise’: 
Unambiguity and the Real 
In trying to understand why the critics are torn between 
positive and negative reactions to ambiguity in language and 
art, I want to argue that it is necessary for criticism to 
recognise the pull of a powerful attraction which has a 
distorting effect on everything it does. It us useful, here, to 
think in terms of Žižek’s understanding of the relation 
between ‘reality’ and ‘the Real’. The critics’ negative 
reactions to ambiguity, which even those who (like 
Nowottny) celebrate its poetic versions seem unable to 
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refrain from mentioning, evince a deep need in the culture of 
letters represented by Gallagher’s ‘country club’ for 
something as yet un-named, something strictly impossible, 
which we might call Unambiguity. 
The fantasmatic female, Ambiguity, who haunts the critics’ 
reflections upon plural meaning implies another figure, an 
opposite, who defines her identity even as she defines his. If 
the ideological framework informing the ‘commonsense’ or 
‘ordinary language’ approach to ambiguity tends to 
characterise it as an untrustworthy (yet indispensable) 
mistress, who twists what is assumed to be the primordially 
unambiguous nature of language, this opposite, 
‘Unambiguity’ must be imagined as male, reliable, 
authoritative, rational, honest and honourable. In short, Old 
Man Unambiguity is logically entailed (although never 
openly mentioned) within the liberal-patriarchal discourse of 
bourgeois literary criticism and theory as the defining other 
of his flighty nemesis, Ambiguity. He personifies the 
commonsensical assumption of a general correspondence 
between words and things, and therefore of the transparency 
of language as a means of representation. He is not named 
precisely because he is the assumed norm. Nevertheless, 
Unambiguity is no less phantasmatic for all that: he is the 
necessary fiction so necessary that his presence is never 
consciously recognised. To view matters from the 
celebratory perspective of Gallagher’s speaker, Ambiguity 
does not have a ‘mixed reputation’, but rather embodies the 
quality of mixed-ness itself (pied, variegated, motley – plural, 
dazzling, unsettling, and alive); conversely, Unambiguity is 
so grey as to be near-invisible: he stands for silence, for 
sameness, and for death. 
Thinking-through these problems in terms of Žižek’s 
philosophical and psychoanalytic interrogation of ‘reality’, 
we can see (as a starting point) that although reality is 
generally assumed to be stable, to be what it claims to be, we 
are nevertheless often presented with aspects of it which are 
bizarre, unaccountable, uncanny, or just too overwhelming 
to contemplate. This everyday or ordinary reality is all too 
easily infiltrated by a disturbing otherness, a fundamental 
ambiguity or unknowability. Once we recognise this 
incomplete or contradictory nature of reality, it is tempting to 
see it not as a natural fact, but as collective construct created 
in order to make bearable a life dependent upon the chaos of 
‘ordinary language’. Thinking of it this way, the troublesome 
figure of Ambiguity, rather than being a perverter of plain 
speaking, starts to be identifiable with the inherently 
troublesome, flawed, unreliable medium of language itself, 
out of which we struggle with only partial success to fashion 
a viable life-world. 
It is interesting to compare the view of these questions 
implied in Betty Rojtman’s understanding of interpretative 
traditions around the Book of Esther. According to these, she 
argues, the divine is revealed by its concealment in apparent 
‘coincidence’; only at the moment of Revelation does 
everything become overt and ‘chance’ disappear. 
According to rabbinical logic, God indeed intervenes in 
history, but in such an indirect way that the event is 
shrouded in natural causation. The only trace that 
remains of Providence is precisely the marks of 
coincidence, the inexplicable happenstances that create a 
gap in everyday normality, equally capable of “falling 
under” pure contingency or theological necessity. … 
Only under such conditions of silence, of night, and of 
exile, only in the apparent omnipotence of chance may 
there be some proof of the possible meaning of surprise, 
of a meaning born of its own contingency: in other words, 
of a logic of discordance, of a discordance that finds its 
ultimate logic without, however, losing its discordant 
nature. (9) 
From the obscured perspective of the material world, we 
have to rely upon coincidence to break through the shell of 
habitual reality to reveal ‘the meaning of surprise’. By 
analogy, the everyday ‘hiddenness’ of meaning in ambiguity 
seems to critics and theorists to point to an underlying state 
of revelatory Unambiguity; the richness of literary language 
in its open-ended plurality ultimately, and paradoxically, 
signifies the author’s self-assured grasp of a univocal truth. 
Similarly, Domique Vaugeois’s metaphors of the blind 
spot and the ‘horizon’ presuppose that the key to correct, 
univocal or unambiguous interpretation is somehow always 
present, even though out of sight. Unfortunately, however, 
the impossibility of such a master-interpretation is constantly 
reasserted by the symbolic structure of language. The very 
fact that the absence (but presence elsewhere) of the key to 
meaning has to be constituted as a metaphor – a 
carrying-across, a differing and deferring – underlines the 
impossibility of that kind of transcendent answer. The 
metaphor (in this case, from optics) performatively negates 
the idea it is intended to communicate. The imagined 
Unambiguity just around the corner is a phantasmatic 
resolution of the problem of irresolvable, endemic ambiguity. 
The appeal to a ‘blind spot’ necessitating both rigorous 
self-examination and a ‘third party’, on the model of 
psychoanalysis, does not finally quite confront the problem, 
the horror (for a society seeking order and propriety) of the 
inherent ambiguity of meaning. 
David G. Brooks offers a useful alternative image for the 
situation in his discussion of the important aspect of desire, 
both in the analysis of ‘the neglected question of the reader’s 
desire and ability to perceive ambiguity’ (2) and in the drive 
towards disambiguation: 
Hypothetically, this point where the text allows us no 
alternatives – where no further ambiguity seems to exist, 
where no choice of meaning seems apparent – is a point 
of ‘truth,’ a point of ‘clarity.’ But we can never be sure of 
this. We should all the time be prepared to find that what 
I have called the brick wall, when and if at last we reach it, 
may be in ourselves, and that the ‘truth’ is in this sense 
something we do not so much attain at last, as if it were a 
destination, an object, as it is a point of exhaustion of 
energy or imagination, something we can accept only 
provisionally, as a limit the nature of which is not itself 
ultimately knowable. (Brooks 2-3) 
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Brooks argues that a certain will to perceive is necessary 
for ambiguity to become apparent, and that texts can thus 
appear unambiguous if that will is lacking. Furthermore, the 
ideal of complete disambiguation (what I am suggesting we 
should term the much looked-for, but un-named 
Unambiguity) is, in Brooks’s account, a matter of running 
out of steam, or hitting a wall. Though apparently less 
interested in the politics of interpretation than Vaugeois, his 
metaphor of the wall is preferable in that it suggests negation, 
an inevitable exhaustion of options in one’s own mind, rather 
than the image of the blind-spot, which suggests that simply 
shifting one’s position will open up new perspectives, or that 
if we could only circumvent or transcend the limits imposed 
by our unavoidable situatedness, the goal of Unambiguity 
would be attainable. 
Thus, Brooks suggests usefully that Unambiguity is not 
‘there’ in the text, or for that matter in the realms of 
possibility, but is an effect of the interpreter’s limitations, the 
end of his or her will to carry on seeking out multiple 
meanings and uncertainties. The only problem with this is 
that it can suggest that ambiguity exists entirely in the 
reader’s willingness to find it, so that a text might correctly 
be found to be completely unambiguous, should its reader 
not be in the mood for ambiguity that day. That said, Brooks 
does seem to attempt a more dialectical sense of the objective 
and subjective determinants of ambiguity in his subsequent 
discussion (3-4), a necessary further stage to his argument, as 
the troubling ambiguity of our self-constituting medium, 
language, refuses to go away, tugging at our coat sleeves 
even when we no longer have the will to pay it any attention. 
All three literary-critical theorists quoted here – Rojtman, 
Vaugeois and Brooks – in offering apparently different 
solutions to the problem of ambiguity, put forward 
arguments similar in structure to the case Žižek is often taken 
to be making, in which the fragile, ambiguity-ridden façade 
of reality masks a simpler, but (in Žižek’s version) 
unbearable, Real – a Void at the heart of being which it is 
impossible for linguistic, socialised, beings to contemplate. 
In literary criticism, as in philosophy, the rickety construct of 
reality hides a simpler, and bigger, truth, although the hidden 
truth which literary critics sense behind the tracery of literary 
language is a good deal more comforting for bourgeois 
society than the horrifying ‘Thing’ so often glimpsed in 
Žižek’s writings. But what if Unambiguity is not the hidden 
truth of language, which might in some moment of 
redemption be revealed (and which is obscurely hinted at in 
everyday symptomatic slips and confusions) but merely an 
aspect of the contorted, unbearable chaos of language, one 
false path amongst a million? Rojtman’s account, in fact, 
seems to acknowledge this undecidability when she indicates 
that, whilst the random phenomena of the temporal world 
might signify some divine essence, equally they might not – 
only at the end of the world will we know the answer, for this 
particular belief system. If we take up this second possibility, 
the Unambiguous is the most uncertain, unknowable, state of 
language and thus the most open to interpretation. 
Meanwhile, for Žižek it is vital to grasp that even this 
widespread understanding of the relation of reality to the 
Real is not correct. Whilst we might like think of reality as a 
comforting distortion of the Real (as ‘the standard “Lacanian” 
notion’ would have it (Žižek xxvii), a ‘grimace of the Real’, 
which crumples it into an anamorphic form which is more 
bearable and usable, for Žižek a more faithful reading of 
Lacan would acknowledge that 
we are compelled to invert the formula quoted above: the 
Real itself is nothing but a grimace of reality: something 
which is nothing but a distorted perspective on reality, 
something which only shines through such a distortion, 
since it is “in itself” completely without substance. … 
The Real is the appearance as appearance; it not only 
appears within appearances, it is also nothing but its own 
appearance – it is simply a certain grimace of reality, a 
certain imperceptible, unfathomable, ultimately illusory 
feature that accounts for the absolute difference within 
identity. … From a materialist standpoint, the Thing is a 
spectre which emerges in the interstices of reality, in so 
far as reality is never homogeneous/consistent, but 
always afflicted by the cut of self-doubling. (Žižek 
xxvii-xxviii) 
So, the Real is a grimace of reality – nothing more than the 
comforting fantasy that something exists beyond the 
perceptible, which intrudes into our world in uncanny form, 
seeming to explain the unsettlingly inconsistent nature of 
that reality. The Real is a rationalisation of the ever-present 
‘cut of self-doubling’, the ways in which language, as a 
structure of absences and differences, continually gets in the 
way of itself, preventing the unambiguous creation and 
transfer of meaning. By analogy, rather than conceiving 
Ambiguity as a ‘grimace’ of a deeper, more genuine 
Unambiguity, Unambiguity should be thought of as the 
grimace of Ambiguity – a convenient invention to fill the 
literary critic’s Void of generalised indeterminacy. 
Here, we can return to the problem that was troubling 
Eleanor Cook about the older notion of ‘ambiguity’ and the 
new-fangled ‘indeterminacy’. Seeking to defend use of the 
older term, she quotes Marjorie Perloff’s statement that  
Derridean readings of specific texts … have a way of 
obscuring those essential differences (as opposed to 
“differance”) that must, after all, concern those of us who 
are still interested in the relationships of particular 
literary works to each other. (Perloff 18) 
Derrida’s arguments, of course, redefine many of the words 
here, including ‘relationships’, ‘literary’ and ‘works’, in a 
way which is difficult to ignore. Nevertheless, if considered 
in the light of the dialectic of Ambiguity and Unambiguity, 
choosing ‘ambiguity’ over the deconstructors’ preferred 
term has much to recommend it. Whilst ‘indeterminacy’ 
better denotes the impossibility of containing the play of 
meaning (owing to the infinite and shifting field of 
differential contexts), ‘ambiguity’ speaks precisely of the 
play of limitations. Ambiguity and Unambiguity are caught 
up in a dialectical relation, each defining and negating the 
other. They register the dilemma of the linguistic subject, 
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caught within the structures of language and the forms of 
history. These limitations may be fantasies, but they are 
fantasies by means of which we dramatise the struggles of 
everyday historical existence, and which make up the stuff of 
literature and art. 
5. ‘The Malady of the Quotidian’ and 
Diseased Social Reality 
The ‘reality’ of everyday life, language and literature, 
consists of fragmented language, meaning and identity. 
Žižek reinforces this point when he writes that ‘Language, in 
its very notion, involves a minimal distance towards its 
literal meaning – not in the sense of some irreducible 
ambiguity or multiple dispersion of meanings, but in the 
more precise sense of “he said X, but what if he really meant 
the opposite”’ (Žižek xiii): language is always distanced 
from itself because it is always possible, in one way or 
another, to use it to mean the opposite of what it ‘should’ 
mean. Ambiguity is always with us, not as the exception, but 
as the rule. Attempts to rationalise this situation, to make it 
understandable and bearable too often end up by making this 
disorderly situation more agreeable to the possessors of 
power and wealth.  
Wallace Stevens’ ambiguous phrase, ‘the malady of the 
quotidian’, from ‘The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad’, with 
which Eleanor Cook illustrates the poetic use of ambiguity in 
prepositions, especially ‘of’ (Cook 236), evokes this 
situation powerfully. Cook takes this phrase to mean that the 
quotidian is endured or experienced as a malady – that to live 
through everyday life is to be sickened by it. In her reading, 
two causes of this idea are possible: the sheer dullness of 
routine, and the internal disease belonging to the person who 
experiences the everyday like that: 
The time of year has grown indifferent. 
Mildew of summer and the deepening snow 
Are both alike in the routine I know. 
I am too dumbly in my being pent. 
The wind attendant on the solstices 
Blows on the shutters of the metropoles, 
Stirring no poet in his sleep, and tolls 
The grand ideas of the villages. 
The malady of the quotidian. … 
Perhaps, if winter once could penetrate 
Through all its purples to the final slate, 
Persisting bleakly in an icy haze, 
One might in turn become less diffident, 
Out of such mildew plucking neater mould 
And spouting new orations of the cold. 
One might. One might. But time will not relent. 
However, just as one plausible meaning of ‘mildew of 
summer’ is the decay of summer, ‘the malady of the 
quotidian’ can refer to the disease of the everyday, the 
sickness which infects the texture of ordinary life, the 
relations within a community or social order, the quality of 
the social reality which people live out from day to day. In 
this interpretation, it is the quotidian itself – the ordinary 
relations of social life – which is ill. This sense of alienation 
is figured through the ambiguity of the season: the decay of 
the summer’s richness and the deepening winter snows are 
poised in a way which provokes the speaker’s ennui: ‘both 
are alike in the routine I know’. Disgust at his enervating 
routine grows together with the disappointing lack of 
definition in the season, which fails to inspire the speaker 
with the poetic feelings traditionally associated with any of 
the seasons. Of course, it is not inevitable that the everyday 
should be boring, stressful or exploitative; it is just that for so 
many people in the era of capitalism, it is. Read in this way, 
the poem implies another, healthy, quotidian which may 
once have existed, and a renewed quotidian which might 
become possible in a transformed world. It acknowledges the 
political in its depiction of a desolate scene: social reality 
itself is sick and longs to be cured. 
Despite this glimmer of hope, the conclusion of the poem 
seems pessimistic, though still ambiguous. Earlier, following 
the break at ‘The malady of the quotidian. …’, there begins, 
with ‘Perhaps’, a middle phase which sounds considerably 
brighter than the downbeat opening. Unexpectedly, though, 
this insight into possibility does not imagine a renewed 
summer, or the conventional hopefulness of spring, but 
rather a winter which is more truly itself than the present 
uncertain season: 
Perhaps, if winter once could penetrate 
Through all its purples to the final slate, 
Persisting bleakly in an icy haze, 
One might in turn become less diffident 
The speaker’s diffidence could be cast aside if winter itself 
could achieve what another of Stevens’s poems, ‘The Snow 
Man’, calls ‘a mind of winter’, or rather if it can ‘penetrate’ 
to some ultimate truth, ‘the final slate’ – bedrock, or that 
‘slate’ on which some final account is kept. Bleak 
persistence is more authentic than the equivocal garments of 
the other seasons and their muddy intermingling around the 
solstices. The man whose pharynx was bad, if indeed he is 
the speaker, expresses a desire for Unambiguity – a realm 
beyond the sickly weather, beyond the coverings (mildewed 
vegetation, dustings or drifts of snow) which obscure the real 
nature of things. This is a quotidian existence in which 
meanings and intentions, both cosmic and interpersonal, are 
distressingly blurred. 
The poem is, ultimately, however, sceptical about the 
prospect of such an Unambiguous epiphany becoming actual. 
It speaks through ambiguity of the relation between 
ambiguity and Unambiguity, and the sheer difficulty of 
resolving this dilemma. If winter could ‘penetrate … to the 
final slate’, 
One might in turn become less diffident, 
Out of such mildew plucking neater mould 
And spouting new orations of the cold. 
One might. One might. But time will not relent. 
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If things were clear again, if we were able to see through 
the ‘icy haze’ to the real, unambiguous, nature of things, a 
new, confident, eloquence – ‘orations of the cold’ – could be 
born from ‘a new mould’. Here, mould, close kin to ‘mildew’, 
one might think, but also meaning perhaps soil or ground, is 
credited with neatness or lack of ambiguity; it can be both the 
fertile bed of new ideas, or the hollow form which gives 
definite shape to a molten mass. The resulting ‘orations’ are 
perhaps ‘of’ (issuing from) the cold itself, or perhaps ‘of’ 
(about) the cold understood as the realm of Unambiguity. 
‘Time’, however, ‘will not relent’. The unambiguity ‘one 
might’ be able to contemplate will never become available as 
there will always be that temporal lag, that deferral of 
meaning, that blurring of seasons, which keeps us trapped 
eternally in the ambiguous realm of the quotidian. Thus 
unfortunately, but in a way which allows us to understand the 
catastrophe, the poem, in its gloom, desires unmediated 
access to Unambiguity, and thus dooms itself to fail. It is 
tempting to conclude, therefore, that to embrace the 
ambiguity of social life, its striation with difference, would 
be to critique the ideological fiction of wise passiveness. 
6. Preparing to Exit: Saying Nothing to 
Nobody 
The words from To the Lighthouse which I took as my 
epigraph (describing Lily Briscoe’s thoughts as she longs to 
rouse Mr Carmichael from his slumber), echo Žižek’s 
description of this state in which ‘language is “not all”, 
because its limit is inscribed into it in the guise of ruptures in 
which the process of the enunciation intervenes in the 
enunciated.’ (Žižek xiii) Lily is painfully aware that the 
situation of any utterance changes its meaning, that this inner 
‘tear’ is always present.  
Wanting to say ‘everything’, she finds that ‘one could say 
nothing to nobody’, which, although it sounds as if it might 
mean, ‘one couldn’t say anything to anybody’, is in fact a 
much more interesting, and ambiguous, claim: 1) that 
nothing is all one can say, because language equally prevents 
one from saying both any ‘one thing’ and ‘everything’, 2) 
that it must be said to nobody, because no person, no socially 
functioning linguistic subject, would know what to do with 
‘nothing’. (It might be thought that she means ‘nothing is 
something that one would not dare say to anybody’, but 
equally it can mean the opposite: that ‘nobody’ is precisely 
the person to whom one can say this ‘nothing’.) Thus, what 
might be taken as a moment at which Lily reaches an 
impasse and falls into despair, might rather be read as a 
moment of revelation. We might replace Eleanor Cook’s 
Everyman-figure of the ‘stranger’, disconcerted by the 
ideologically-loaded ‘reputation’ of the glamorous 
Ambiguity, with this excellent ‘nobody’, a figure of the other 
with whom we can converse in the language of nothing. 
Nobody, with whom we can say ‘nothing’ (in other words, 
those unreliable, broken, communications which are all that 
is allowed by language), should perhaps become the 
protagonist of literary studies, a potential person who is, like 
us, forever in the unfinished, political, process of becoming. 
We might imagine, at least in a world of emancipated social 
relations, the ambiguous ‘nothing’ of our language, whether 
‘ordinary’ or ‘literary’, as the language of that emancipation: 
a discourse in which the slipperiness of words need not spell 
the downfall of our neighbours, nor our own self-undoing. 
If criticism cannot free itself from its double standard over 
ambiguity, though, it will always be marked by a tacit, 
ineffectual and politically regressive moralism. If it can 
reconcile itself to the incomplete project of reality without, 
consciously or unconsciously, basing its claims upon an 
unseen and idealised Unambiguity, it might stand a chance of 
contributing to that new world. Proper critique of the 
ideological role played by ambiguity in critical writing will 
help critics to deepen our experience and understanding, and, 
above all, to sharpen our awareness that the world needs to 
be altered. The economic and political forces which deprive 
life of its subtlety, its variety and its transformative power for 
so many are the enemies of poetry in its broadest and most 
meaningful sense. 
7. Notes 
1. See Cook, pp. 231-2; also 233 and f.n. 7; also Gerald 
Graff, ‘Determinacy and Indeterminacy’ in Critical Terms 
for Literary Study, eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas 
McLaughlin, Second Edition, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 163-76. 
2. Cf. Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’. Glyph, 
vol I. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 
172-97. 
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